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ABSTRACT 
 
Manuscript Type: Literature review. 
Research Question/Issue: Over the last four decades, research on the relationship between boards 
of directors and strategy has proliferated. Yet to date there is little theoretical and empirical 
agreement regarding the question of how boards of directors contribute to strategy. This review 
assesses the extant literature by highlighting emerging trends and identifying several avenues for 
future research. 
Research Findings/Insights: Using a content-analysis of 150 articles published in 23 manage-
ment journals until 2007, we describe and analyze how research on boards of directors and 
strategy has evolved over time. We illustrate how topics, theories, settings and sources of data 
interact and influence insights about board-strategy relationships during three specific periods. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study illustrates that research on boards of directors 
and strategy evolved from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and cognitive 
approaches. Our results encourage future studies (i) to examine the impact of institutional and 
context-specific factors on the (expected) contribution of boards to strategy, and (ii) to apply 
alternative methods to fully capture the impact of board processes and dynamics on strategy-
making. 
Practical/Policy Implications: The increasing interest in boards of directors’ contribution to 
strategy echoes a movement towards more strategic involvement of boards of directors. However, 
best governance practices and the emphasis on board independence and control may hinder the 
board contribution to the strategic decision-making. Our study invites investors and policy-
makers to consider the requirements for an effective strategic task when they nominee board 
members and develop new regulations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few decades, corporate governance systems have undergone profound changes 
worldwide. The globalization and liberalization of financial markets, corporate governance 
scandals and stronger demands for accountability and transparency have placed the duties and 
functioning of boards of directors at the centre of the corporate governance debate (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Ingley and Van der Walt, 2005). The societal call for an increasing involvement 
of the board of directors has raised the question what the appropriate role of boards should be. 
While scholars and practitioners have generally acknowledged the importance of adequate board 
control and independence (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Jensen and Zajac, 2004), boards’ 
involvement in their strategic role, or the lack thereof, has been widely debated (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Golden and Zajac, 2001; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). 
 The discussion on boards’ strategic involvement has been fueled by a combination of 
contextual factors, alternate theoretical perspectives and inconclusive empirical results. First, in 
the 1970s, it was observed that US boards of directors had been rather passive in the wake of 
corporate failures and more strategic involvement was necessary to restore the public confidence 
(Clendenin, 1972; Heller and Milton, 1972; Mace, 1976; Machin and Wilson, 1979; Vance, 
1979). More recently, corporate governance reforms (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Enrione, Mazza and Zerboni, 2006; Sheridan, Jones and Marston, 2006) and the increasing 
influence of institutional investors may have brought board members closer to strategic decision-
making (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson and Grossman, 2002). These 
developments have stimulated boards of directors to challenge CEOs, and to become more 
involved in strategy, an area that in the past was exclusively controlled by CEOs (Ruigrok, Peck 
and Keller, 2006; Monks and Minow, 2008). Second, the emergence of alternative, partially 
conflicting theoretical viewpoints have contributed to the debate. Theories, such as agency 
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 3 
theory, resource dependency theory and stewardship theory, have ascribed different 
responsibilities to boards with regard to strategy (Davis, 1991; Maassen and Van Den Bosch, 
1999). Third, while studies suggest that board members are becoming more aware of their 
strategy role (Demb and Neubaurer, 1992; Heracleous, 2001; Huse, 2005), scholars have 
regularly highlighted the disagreement in the empirical research on the relationship between 
boards and strategy (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Deutsch, 2005). 
The above theoretical pluralism and empirical inconclusiveness in the literature on boards 
of directors and strategy raises the following questions: what is the stance of research in this 
area? How has the field been evolving over time? And what are the main challenges and future 
opportunities? In this paper we analyze 150 articles on boards and strategy published in 23 
management journals until 2007, in order to provide answers to these questions. Thereby, this 
paper contributes to the literature on boards and strategy in three ways. First, it describes how 
studies on boards and strategy have been evolving and illustrates how certain topics, theories, 
settings and sources of data interact and have influenced our knowledge about board-strategy 
relationships during certain periods. For instance, our data reveal that during the 1990s the field 
was dominated by empirical studies in a US setting that mainly refer to agency theory and focus 
on the determinants and consequences of boards’ strategic involvement. Second, the paper 
complements previous literature reviews that have (partially) covered this domain (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Deutsch, 2005). Given the time elapsed since these reviews, 
the intensification of the corporate governance debate internationally and the large number of 
studies conducted on boards of directors and strategy more recently, it is the right time for due 
reflection on achievements in this area (Huse, 2005). Third, the paper highlights several avenues 
to advance the field of study. Our findings encourage governance scholars to further investigate 
the impact of contextual forces at multiple levels, to further comprehend board processes and 
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dynamics, and to adopt methods aimed at opening the black box of board research. Finally, the 
article has implications for practice. Existing board practices emphasize, in fact, board control 
and independence as antecedents of good governance, but these aspects may also hinder the 
board’s contribution to strategy-making. In line with some recent works, our study suggests that 
the requirements for an effective strategic task should be taken into account while composing 
boards and devising new regulations.  
 The paper is structured as follows: section one describes the basics of the board-strategy 
debate and the theoretical pluralism and empirical inconclusiveness emerging from the literature 
on boards and strategy. Section two describes the research method, i.e., how we selected journals 
and determined our sample of 150 articles to be included in our review, how we coded the 
content of each article and how data were analyzed statistically. Next, in section three we present 
the results of our review, describe how the field has evolved and illustrate how certain topics, 
theories, settings and sources of data interact and have dominated in certain time periods. In our 
final section, we discuss the implications for both theory and practice and present a research 
agenda for future studies on boards and strategy. 
 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL DEBATE ON BOARDS AND STRATEGY 
The appropriate role of the board of directors in formulating and implementing strategy has been 
long debated (Andrews 1981a, 1981b; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Useem, 2003). While the literature has acknowledged the importance and need for adequate 
board control and independence (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Jensen and Zajac, 2004), both 
the contributions of boards to strategy and the desirability of such practice have remained topics 
of discussion (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Daily et al., 2003). In light of a multitude of theoretical 
lenses and empirical findings in the management literature, Zahra and Pearce’s observation that 
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 5 
‘there is controversy over the nature of directors’ strategic role’ (1989: 328) still seems to be 
topical after twenty years of research. 
The debate on boards’ strategic contribution dates as far back as the 1970s. During this 
decade, several US scholars and practitioners observed that boards were rather passive in the 
wake of US corporate failures and that more strategic involvement was necessary to restore 
public confidence (Clendenin, 1972; Mace, 1976; Vance, 1979). A growing theoretical debate 
was boosted by Fama and Jensen’s seminal work (1983) in which they distinguished decision 
management, i.e. initiating and implementing (strategic) decisions, and decision control, i.e. 
ratifying and monitoring (strategic) actions. The two tasks were ascribed to the top management 
team and the board of directors respectively. Their rationale has influenced the debate ever since. 
By relying on a clear distinction of responsibilities between boards and management, scholars 
have viewed the potential contributions of boards to strategy as fairly limited due to their distance 
from day-to-day operations, the presence of information asymmetries and the need to remain 
independent (Conger, Lawler and Finegold, 2001; Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Charan, 2005). 
Instead, others have argued that boards of directors are legally responsible for the strategy of 
firms (Harrison, 1987; Coffee, 2005; Yawson, 2006) and that boards are in an excellent position 
to contribute to strategy (Andrews, 1980; Tricker, 1984; Goodstein, Gautum and Boeker, 1994; 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). 
 
Theoretical Pluralism in the Board-Strategy Debate 
From a theoretical standpoint, the debate around board strategic involvement has been fueled by 
conflict and consensus theories (Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Maassen and Van Den 
Bosch, 1999). A conflict perspective conceptualizes managers as self-interested agents that 
should be closely monitored (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, agency 
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theory posits that boards affect strategic choices by preventing managers from acting 
opportunistically at the expense of shareholders (Mizruchi, 1983). In this view, boards are not 
expected to initiate and implement strategies, but they contribute through ratifying and 
monitoring strategic decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Goodstein et al., 1994). Board 
involvement in strategy appears to conflict with this view, as (i) it would make boards of 
directors co-responsible for strategic decisions and (ii) it would jeopardize the required distance 
between board members and managers (Boyd, 1990, 1994; Huse, 1994; Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003).  
A consensus perspective conceptualizes managers as intrinsically motivated agents acting 
in the best interest of the firm (Da is, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Accordingly, through 
various theoretical lenses boards are defined as organizational bodies that may support 
empowered managers in strategy formulation and implementation (Bezemer, Maassen, Van den 
Bosch and Volberda, 2007; Huse, 2007). For example, resource dependency theory suggests that 
board members are in an excellent position to contribute to (strategic) decision-making by 
providing access to resources on which firms depend (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The stewardship theory challenges the rationale of agency 
theory by arguing that the interests of managers and board members do not necessarily collide 
(Davis et al., 1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). In this perspective, the role of boards is to 
facilitate and empower managers, also in the realm of strategy. More lately, cognitive and 
behavioral approaches have emphasized the importance of understanding cognitive contributions 
of board members as well as the impact of boardroom dynamics on strategic decision-making 
(Pettigrew, 1992; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999; Pye and Camm, 2003). 
 
Empirical Inconclusiveness in the Board-Strategy Debate 
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Aside to the theoretical debate, empirical findings provide mixed results as well. In recent 
decades scholars have regularly emphasized the presence of a wealth of inconclusive empirical 
findings (Deutsch, 2005). On the one hand, studies have shown that boards have been rather 
passive and subject to CEOs and executives’ dominance (Mace, 1971; Herman, 1981; Kosnik, 
1987; Lorsch and McIver, 1989). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that boards might 
destroy value when they become involved in strategy (cf. Jensen, 1993; Fulghieri and Hodrick, 
2006; Hitt, Harrison and Ireland, 2006). On the other hand, scholars have shown that boards are 
becoming more actively involved in strategy (Zahra, 1990; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004; Ingley 
and van der Walt, 2005; Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006; Schmidt and Bauer, 2006). Moreover, boards 
have affected important elements of strategies, such as the scope of the firm (Tihanyi, Johnson, 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 2003; Jensen and Zajac, 2004), entrepreneurship and innovation (Fried, 
Burton and Hisrich, 1998; Zahra, Neubaum and Huse, 2000; Hoskisson et al., 2002), strategic 
change (Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Filatotchev and 
Toms, 2003), R&D strategies (Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Kor, 2006) and 
internationalization (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998; Datta, Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2003). 
 In sum, the literature on boards of directors and strategy may be characterized by 
theoretical pluralism and by empirical inconclusiveness, both originating from scholarly 
contributions and anecdotal evidence. In the remainder of this paper, we seek to highlight how 
distinct patterns of research have emerged over the years and their key attributes. 
 
METHOD 
Selection of Journals and Papers 
To examine the evolving literature on boards and strategy, we decided to focus on peer-reviewed 
studies published in management journals, regardless of their impact factor (Seglen, 1994). We 
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 8 
selected all journals included in the management category within the ISI-Web of Knowledge 
during 2007. Our search produced 81 records in total. In the next phase, we used the databases 
ABI/Inform, Business Source Premier, Ebsco-Host, JSTOR and Swetsnet to search for all paper 
publications containing simultaneously the terms ‘board’ and ‘strateg*’ or ‘director’ and 
‘strateg*’ in the title, abstract and/or key words. This approach enabled us to identify a set of 
articles directly referring to the debate on boards’ and directors’ contribution to strategy. This 
procedure resulted in 371 hits in total: 150 papers (40.4%) turned out to be relevant to our 
examination. The large difference between the number of hits and the number of included papers 
is due to several factors. We excluded papers referring to board games, papers using the term 
across-the-board, fictive Harvard cases, letters from editors, book reviews, papers referring to 
organizations with the term ‘board’ in their name and papers referring to other management 
layers than the board of directors. In sum, our final sample consists of 150 articles published in 
23 journals from 1972 (first included paper) until 2007. 
 
Content Analysis 
In order to analyze the evolving nature of studies on boards of directors and strategy, two raters 
have independently analyzed and coded the set of 150 articles (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; 
Krippendorf, 2005). The two raters were asked to codify all basic elements of a paper: (i) type of 
article, (ii) main research topic, (iii) use of theories, (iv) research setting, (v) source of data and 
(vi) the definition of board strategic involvement (Insch, Moore and Murphy, 1997). The coding 
scheme was pre-tested on two sub-samples of 30 articles after which the raters came to an agree-
ment about the final set of items to be used in the classification for each category. A review was 
then conducted on the whole set of articles (D’Aveni and McMillan, 1994). At the end of the 
coding procedure, the two sets of data were matched. There appeared to be a high overlap in the 
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responses: only 54 out of 828 items were coded differently by the two raters. Inter-rater reliability 
scores were calculated and the percent agreement (93.5%) and Cohen’s Kappa (0.916) were both 
above the acceptance threshold (Cohen, 1960; Dewey, 1983). A final meeting was arranged to 
discuss the 54 inconsistencies in the responses. To reconcile the disagreements, the articles were 
re-read and recoded. If the raters still did not agree on the coding, a senior strategy professor – 
who was involved in the research project – was asked to provide a clarifying interpretation (Lee, 
1999). In the following sections we will discuss all categories in more detail. 
(i) Type of article. The 150 articles were differentiated according to their nature: 
‘conceptual’ versus ‘empirical’. Papers were coded ‘conceptual’ when they aimed to advance or 
refine theory and were solely based on deductive reasoning without any empirical metrics. Papers 
were labeled ‘empirical’ if authors applied inductive logics, described their methods in a separate 
section and argued on the strength of data obtained from qualitative research methods (i.e. 
interviews, participant observation and anecdotes) and/or quantitative methods (i.e. archival data 
and surveys). 
 (ii) Main research topic. Building upon prior studies (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992; Stiles, 2001; Huse, 2005) we distinguished four groups of papers in relation to 
the main research topic. The first group examines the determinants of board strategic 
involvement. Among others, scholars have sought to relate environmental characteristics, 
ownership structure, board composition and incentive mechanisms to various levels of board 
strategic involvement. The second group of studies investigates the consequences of board 
strategic involvement. For instance, scholars have addressed the impact of specific board 
characteristics on strategic outcomes, such as diversification, internationalization, innovation and 
strategic change. The third group of papers explores boards’ participation in strategic decision-
making processes, i.e., the ways in which boards contribute internally to decision making 
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processes by interacting with TMTs in various phases. Finally, the fourth group of papers 
discusses from a normative stance why board strategic involvement may or may not be desirable. 
Topics of debate include the reasons for the perceived passivity of boards of directors in this 
respect and the question how far board involvement into strategy should be going. 
 (iii) Use of theories. To examine the theoretical development of the field, we mapped to 
which theories each paper explicitly referred. Given the widespread application of agency theory 
in the literature on boards and strategy, we decided to create a variable capturing whether a paper 
referred to: (i) agency theory solely; (ii) multiple theories, including agency theory and (iii) other 
theories than agency theory or no theory. 
(iv) Research Setting. As highlighted by comparative corporate governance studies 
highlight, institutional contexts widely vary between nations and have a profound impact on local 
corporate governance structures and practices (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera, 
Filatotchev, Gospel and Jackson, 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Therefore an important 
dimension to our analysis is added by examining the empirical setting in which research on 
boards and strategy has been conducted. As most empirical articles in our sample are based on 
US data, we decided to use the following categorization: (i) articles using exclusively data drawn 
from the US; (ii) articles using data from multiple-countries, including the US and (iii) articles 
using data drawn from a non-US context. 
 (v) Source of data. To provide insights in the use of different data sources, we coded the 
empirical articles with the following six categories: i) interviews, ii) anecdotal evidence, iii) 
archival data, iv) survey data, v) direct observations and vi) combinations of the above-mentioned 
sources. In the latter category we only included articles using combinations of interviews and 
survey data, interviews and archival data, and survey data and archival data. 
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 (vi) Definition of board strategic involvement. Board strategic involvement is a latent 
construct and no single way to define or interpret it emerges from literature (Ravasi and Zattoni, 
2006). Building upon prior studies (Zahra and Pearce, 1990; 1992; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; 
McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999), we distinguished four broad categories to classify the definition 
of board strategic involvement. The first category includes studies assessing how boards of 
directors impact on the general strategy of companies. For example, by developing the mission, 
establishing long-term targets and allocating resources (Zahra and Pearce, 1990; Volberda, 
Baden-Fuller and Van den Bosch, 2001). The second group of papers investigates how boards 
contribute to specific strategic outcomes. The majority of papers in this category are input-output 
studies that aim to identify how board composition affects strategic outcomes, such as 
innovation, change, diversification, and mergers and acquisitions (Johnson et al., 1996). The third 
group encompasses research that explores how boards participate in various phases of strategic 
decision-making through interacting with TMTs. Among others, the studies conducted by Judge 
and Dobbins (1993), Forbes and Milliken (1999) and Rindova (1999) are included in this 
category. Finally, the fourth category consists of papers in which the nature of board strategic 
involvement is not clearly stated and defined. Most papers published in the 1970s and 80’s fit 
into this category, as the concept of board strategic involvement was in general marginally 
defined in the early years. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Growing Attention to Research on Boards and Strategy 
In recent decades, scholars and practitioners have debated the relationship between the boards of 
directors and strategy. Figure 1 illustrates the historical development of the number of published 
articles explicitly referring to boards and strategy in the management literature. As depicted, the 
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first paper was published in 1972 and in the following decades the number of published articles 
steadily increased. Studies on boards and strategy were published irregularly during the early 
years, prior to the publication of Zahra and Pearce’s study in 1989. Since then, the marked 
increase in the average number of articles on the topic has reflected the growing attention of 
scholars in the field of strategy and governance (from 1.3 in the period 1972-1989 to 9.6 in the 
period 2001-2007). Also in relative terms the space devoted to studies on boards of directors and 
strategy has increased: from 0.1 articles per management journal per year in the period 1972-
1989 to 0.4 articles in the period 2001-2007. Finally, it is noteworthy that in the period 1972-
1989 most papers were published in general, applied practice-oriented journals such as the Long 
Range Planning (8), California Management Review (6) and Harvard Business Review (5). Since 
1990 two specialized journals in strategy and corporate governance, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review (24) and Strategic Management Journal (14), have contributed the most 
(see figure 2). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 
------------------------------ 
 
Descriptives and Interactions of Topics, Theories, Settings and Data Sources 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the characteristics of the articles that have contributed to the 
growing attention in boards of directors and strategy. The papers are overwhelmingly empirical 
(n=114; 76%). Most empirical studies have been conducted in the USA (n=72; 62%) or in 
multiple settings including the USA (n=5; 4%). With regard to the main research topic, most 
articles have contributed to the debate on the desirability of board strategic involvement (n=41; 
27%), although the overall sample is distributed evenly across all categories. In terms of use of 
theories, agency theory is the prevailing lens (n= 63; 42%): it has been used as the sole 
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theoretical lens (n=27; 18%) and in combination with other theoretical lenses (n=36; 24%). The 
sources of data are quite diverse, although the use of archival data (n=45; 40%) and of multiple 
sources (n=22; 19%) is most common. Finally, the largest group of studies defines board strategic 
involvement in terms of boards’ contributions to specific strategic outcomes (n=52; 35%), while 
the smallest group defines it as boards’ participation to strategic decision-making (n=22; 15%). 
 
--------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 
--------------------- 
 
 Furthermore, figure 3 illustrates how topics, theories, settings and data sources interact. 
Most notable are the key differences between empirical studies that have been conducted in a US 
context and those conducted in a non-US context. In the US context scholars have published most 
on the determinants (n=26; 36%) and consequences of board strategic involvement (n=21; 29%). 
Furthermore, these studies refer to agency theory in most instances (n=38; 53%) and mainly use 
archival data (n=39; 54%). Finally, board strategic involvement has generally been defined as the 
contribution of boards to specific strategic outcomes, such as innovation, strategic change and 
mergers and acquisitions (n=37; 51%). In contrast, studies conducted in a non-US context most 
often examine the participation in strategic decision-making by boards (n=14; 38%). 
Furthermore, these studies often refer to alternative theoretical lenses (n=25; 68%) and use 
qualitative methods, such as interviews (n=10; 27%) and direct observations (n=5; 14%) more 
often. Finally, these studies differ in their definition of board strategic involvement, i.e., all 
categories are evenly represented. Theoretical papers differ from both types of empirical papers. 
These papers generally address the practice and question the desirability of boards’ strategic 
involvement (n=19; 53%), show a limited reference to agency theory (n=13; 36%) and the 
Page 13 of 37
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 14 
definition of board strategic involvement is in most instances rather unspecified (n=17; 47%). We 
tested the above-mentioned interactions for statistical significance. Several cross tabulations 
reveal that the relationships between the main research topic, use of theories, research setting and 
the definition of board strategic involvement are indeed statistically significant at the 0.05-level. 
 
Three Distinct Research Periods 
In order to observe an evolutionary pattern in previous research, we identified three periods and 
assigned each article to one of them according to the year of publication. Even though the three 
windows are not homogeneous in terms of time-length, we clustered them in accordance with 
two criteria. First, we observed changes in the slope of the curve with cumulative number of 
articles published over time (see figure 1). We considered a cut-off for a ‘new period’ if (i) there 
was a sharp increase in the number of publications in a given year and if (ii) this number was 
significantly higher than the average during the previous years. Second, we identified a ‘new 
period’ if relevant and highly influential articles (or groups of articles) came out during a given 
year or the year before. Major changes in a field of study often occur thanks to breakthrough and 
innovative articles that suggest new theoretical approaches and/or methods and set a new agenda 
for future research (Kuhn, 1962). We checked for robustness by examining whether our findings 
would change if we slightly changed our cut-off points. Although our results became less 
significant, overall the witnessed developments proved to be robust. 
 Our first observation window covers the period from the first publication (1972) until 
Zahra and Pearce’s literature review in 1989. In this period, the interest in studies on boards and 
strategy seems to be infrequent and concentrated around the years 1972, 1979 and 1986. In 1990, 
one year after Zahra and Pearce’s literature review, six papers on the topic were published, i.e. 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), Boyd (1990), Hoskisson and Turk (1990), Kosnik (1990), Lang 
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and Lockhart (1990) and Zahra (1990). These papers provided input to a new strand of research 
and most of the literature in the following years sought to analyze the relationship between board 
composition and strategic outcomes. Our second observation window ends in 2000. In 1999 and 
2000 great interest around boards and strategy arouse, as 17 articles were published in the two 
years. During this period an alternate stream of literature came out with a new perspective on 
boards’ roles and behavior (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; Forbes and Milliken, 
1999; Gulati and Westphal, 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999; Hillman, 
Canella and Paetzold, 2000). These researchers had a significant impact on the field and fueled 
the debate around cognitive and behavioral approaches. In the following sections, we will discuss 
the distinctive characteristics of articles published during each period (see figures 4 and 5). 
 
--------------------------- 
Insert Figures 4 and 5 
---------------------------- 
 
Period 1 (1972-1989): The emerging debate about boards’ strategic involvement  
The early literature explicitly referring to boards and strategy dates back to the beginning of the 
1970s. At that time, the debate was mostly driven by the practical needs that the US business 
community was facing. Corporate failures and governance scandals together with the increasing 
requirements for higher accountability fueled studies on boards and governance issues (Vance, 
1979; Lorsch, 1986). At the same time, strategy started to become established as research field 
(Volberda and Elfring, 2001), fueled by major changes in the business environment of most 
Western countries (i.e. the increase in Japanese competition and the oil crisis) (Pettigrew, 
Thomas and Whittington, 2002). During this first period, research on boards and strategy was 
characterized by a debate on the desirability of active board involvement, also in the realm of 
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strategy. This discussion followed an ongoing US debate around a perceived passivity of boards 
of directors at that time (Mace, 1971; Herman, 1981; Stiles and Taylor, 2002). The ongoing 
debate has been hosted mainly by three general, applied practice-oriented journals (i.e. Long 
Range Planning, California Management Review and Harvard Business Review) that covered 
almost 80% of the studies in this period (see figure 2). Regardless of the type of articles, both 
conceptual and empirical articles have generally sought to initiate a discussion around the 
desirability of boards’ involvement in strategy (67%).  
Overall, two strands of research with opposite views on the topic can be distinguished 
during this period. On the one hand, boards were considered one of the main actors in strategic 
decision-making processes, though they are not expected to formulate strategy. For instance, 
Andrews (1980; 1981a) emphasized that boards are in a perfect position to search for alternative 
corporate strategies. Furthermore, Felton (1979) argued that boards should confront management 
in case where results deviate from expectations, also in the realm of strategy. To support adequate 
fulfillment of the strategy role, Wommack (1979 and Harrison (1987) suggest that boards should 
create an internal board committee dedicated to this issue. On the other hand, another group of 
scholars strongly argued that boards should not be actively involved in strategy. For instance, 
according to Heller and Milton (1972) strategic issues are a difficult subject for directors to get 
into, as they are often not involved in the company on a daily basis. Moreover, Mace (1976) 
argues that outside directors are mostly hired through cooptation or hold board positions 
elsewhere; this practice may limit their commitment and involvement in strategic issues. Finally 
Rosenstein (1987) describes several hurdles that directors may face when they try to get involved 
in strategy. 
In sum, the key characteristics of research during this period are (i) the lack of one 
prevailing theory, (ii) the predominance of articles discussing the desirability of board strategic 
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involvement (67%) and (iii) a broadly defined concept of board strategic involvement in most 
instances (79%). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Zahra and Pearce, at the end of this 
period, assert that “overall, empirical research on the boards’ strategic role is in its infancy 
stage” (1989:304). 
 
Period 2 (1990-2000): The heyday of ‘input-output approaches’ 
Two breakthrough articles influenced the emerging literature on boards of directors and strategy 
at the beginning of the 1990s. Zahra and Pearce’s (1989) literature review highlighted the 
importance of understanding the relationship between board characteristics and structure, and 
strategy. Additionally, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) discussed the prominence of board-TMT 
dynamics and its implications for strategy. Furthermore, they emphasized also that ‘evaluating 
the strategic implications of boards of directors requires empirical analysis’ (1990:73). 
Following these suggestions, multiple studies were published during the next decade. Generally, 
they relate board characteristics and structure (i.e. board size, CEO-duality, board diversity, 
outsider ratio, tenure and directors’ equity stakes) to strategic outcomes, such as acquisitions 
(Haunschild, 1993; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998) strategic 
change (Goodstein and Boeker, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994; Bergh, 1995), corporate 
restructuring (Sheppard, 1994; Daily, 1995), entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1996), internationalization 
(Sanders and Carpenter, 1998) and R&D expenditures (Baysinger et al., 1991). Generally, these 
studies provide mixed evidence of relationships between board characteristics and strategy (Daily 
et al., 2003; Deutsch, 2005). 
 Illustrative of this line of inquiry is that the majority of studies (i) refers to agency theory 
(54%), (ii) uses US samples (86%), (iii) analyzes archival data (49%) and (iv) was published in 
the journals Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly and Strategic 
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Management Journal (37.3%) (see figure 2). Interestingly, two different lines of inquiry started 
to develop as well. One group examined the antecedents of board strategic involvement (Zahra, 
1990; Zahra and Pearce, 1990; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Fried et al., 1998). A second group 
investigated the effects of the relationship between board and TMTs on strategic decision-making 
(Bradshaw-Camball and Murray, 1991; Judge and Dobbins, 1993; Fried and Hisrich, 1995; 
Westphal, 1998; Gulati and Westphal, 1999). At the end of the 1990s, contributions by Forbes 
and Milliken (1999), McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) and Rindova (1999) opened up the debate on 
boards’ contribution to strategy processes and led to a new stream of research in this area. 
 
Period 3 (2001-2007): Towards more pluralism in the board-strategy debate 
As witnessed by the sharp increase in the average number of papers published each year (9.6), 
research on boards and strategy gained even more momentum during this period. These years are 
characterized by the co-existence of different research approaches. Most studies still focus on the 
determinants and consequences of board strategic involvement (47%), use archival data (36%) in 
a US setting (49%) and extensively refer to agency theory (42%). At the same time, studies with 
different features emerged in this period. First, empirical studies drawing on non-US data 
become more frequent. For example, the corporate governance contexts of Australia (Bonn and 
Fisher, 2005), Belgium (Van den Heuvel, Van Gils and Voordeckers, 2005), Italy (Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007), Japan (Yoshikawa and Phan, 2005), New Zealand (Ingley and Van der Walt, 
2005), Norway (Huse, Minichilli and Shoning, 2005) and the United Kingdom (Long, Dulewicz 
and Gay, 2005; Yawson, 2006) were examined. Second, new theoretical standpoints have been 
used to interpret phenomena (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Keenan, 2004) and most of the published 
articles do not refer to agency theory, but to alternate theoretical lenses (58%).  
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 Building upon earlier contributions by Forbes and Milliken (1999), McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999) and Rindova (1999), research on boards and strategy is also characterized by the 
emergence of behavioral and cognitive approaches also. Studies in this tradition aim to 
understand how boards participate in strategic decision-making as an active part of it (Stiles and 
Taylor, 1996). Based on this approach, Jensen and Zajac (2004) and Useem and Zelleke (2006) 
highlight that boards participate in these processes through continuously interacting with 
managers and/or other stakeholders. Moreover, Rindova (1999) and Fiegener (2005) argue that 
board of directors’ work is not limited to ratification and monitoring only (cf. Fama and Jensen, 
1983): boards of directors should rather be involved in all phases. Furthermore, Mueller, Sillince, 
Harvey and Howorth (2003) underline the conflicting requirements boards of directors face in 
fulfilling the monitoring role (independence) and the strategy role (involvement). Scholars have 
also started to investigate the joint impact of board dynamics, working style and structure on 
strategic issues (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Huse, 2005), as well as how the expertise, abilities and 
network ties of board members affect their ability and motivation to contribute to strategy 
formulation (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Roberts, 2002; Hillman, 2005) and the board of 
directors’ overall capacity to impact on CEOs and TMTs (Westphal and Frederickson, 2001; 
Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton and Dalton, 2006; Grossman and Cannella, 2006). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Over the last four decades, the interest in research on the relationship between boards of directors 
and strategy has grown significantly (see figure 1). Scholars and practitioners have extensively 
discussed the potential contribution of boards as well as the (un)desirability of active boards in 
this domain. Witnessing pluralism and controversy in the literature on boards and strategy in 
terms of theoretical underpinnings and empirical findings, our review provides insights on 
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previous research contributions illustrating the way in which the literature evolved, highlighting 
implications for both scholars and practitioners, and suggesting avenues for future research. In 
particular, our results highlight two important trends in literature on boards and strategy.  
 First, our findings illustrate that research on boards of directors and strategy developed 
from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and cognitive approaches (see figures 3 
and 4). While early studies mainly discussed the desirability of board strategic involvement 
(period 1) and used ‘input-output approaches’ (period 2), a more recent strand of research posits 
boards as decision-making groups whose internal processes and external context should be better 
understood (e.g. Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Ravasi 
and Zattoni, 2006). This evolution is in line with the general shift in strategic management from 
studying ‘strategy as content’ to understanding ‘strategy as process and context’ (cf. Pettigrew et 
al., 2002).  
 Second, our results highlight that research questions, theories, settings and sources of data 
interact and influence our insights about the relationship between boards and strategy (see table 
3). On the one hand, most empirical studies analyze US companies, refer to agency theory, 
examine the role of boards with regard to specific outcomes, and use archival data as main source 
of data. On the other hand, a relatively limited number of studies analyze non-US companies, 
define board strategic involvement as boards’ participation in decision-making, and use 
qualitative methods (cf. Deutsch, 2005). 
 
Theoretical Implications 
Our study has several scholarly implications and highlights avenues for future research. First, our 
results reveal the need to understand the role of context at multiple levels as (i) most of the 
contemporary wisdom originates from US-samples of large public companies and (ii) 
Page 20 of 37
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 21 
comparative corporate governance studies are sparse (see figure 3). As a result, the impact of the 
national setting (e.g. the legal system, culture and economic conditions) and firm characteristics 
(e.g. the ownership structure, board structure, firm performance and life-cycle) on the relation-
ship between boards and strategy is not fully understood (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurro, 2004; 
Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006; Hambrick, Van Werder and Zajac, 2008). For example, as the majority 
of studies referring to agency theory used US samples and ‘input-outcome approaches’, the 
application of agency theory to strategic decision-making processes in different national contexts 
may lead to the discovery of new theoretical and empirical issues (Peck and Ruigrok, 2000). 
Furthermore, the growing number of studies that define board strategic involvement as 
participation in strategic decision-making may stimulate more dynamic theories and promote 
research designs explicitly investigating the changing contributions of boards of directors over 
time (cf. Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006). In sum, multi-level approaches and international comparative 
corporate governance studies may contribute to the development of a better understanding of 
interactions between macro, meso and micro dynamics and how these forces jointly shape the 
relationship between boards of directors and strategy (Volberda et al., 2001; Volberda and 
Lewin, 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008). 
 Second, our results highlight the number and variety of theoretical perspectives and 
inconclusive empirical findings. More recently, scholars emphasized the need to go beyond 
structuralism and to examine board processes, board behavior and directors’ cognition. This 
movement encourages scholars to investigate what boards and their members actually do, think 
and/or perceive (Pettigrew, 1992; Lawrence, 1997; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Although our 
literature review shows an increasing interest to these topics, the number of studies in this area is 
still rather limited. Given the importance of understanding politics and bargaining processes 
between key actors (cf. Bradshaw-Cambell and Murray, 1991; Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006; Parker, 
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2007) and the impact of overlapping and conflicting preferences within and between groups of 
actors (Hambrick et al., 2008), a considerable amount of research remains to be done in this area 
in order to clarify and improve our understanding of the board of directors’ contribution to 
strategy-making. For example, future studies should investigate the interaction between large 
shareholders, board members and top management teams inside and outside board meetings 
(Useem and Zelleke, 2006). To reach this purpose, governance scholars are encouraged to open 
the black box of board research developing longitudinal studies aimed at exploring processes 
over an extensive time period and collecting primary data using interviews, surveys and direct 
observation techniques (Pettigrew et al., 2002; Huse, 2005). 
 
Practical Implications 
Our empirical findings have also implications for practitioners. First, the increasing attention in 
boards’ contribution to strategy echoes a movement towards more board strategic involvement. 
Interestingly, this development seems to be conflicting with principles from agency theory that 
consider decision control as the primary role of boards of directors (cf. Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Based on principles from agency theory, governance recommendations and best practices have 
generally encouraged independence and formality between independent directors and executive 
directors (Huse, 1994; Hamel, Van Wijk and Van Rooij, 1998; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). 
This view has been reinforced after each wave of corporate governance scandals, as reform 
initiatives (such as SOX, EU directives and national corporate governance codes) have generally 
emphasized board control and board independence as key mechanisms to ensure corporate 
accountability (Daily et al., 2003: Enrione et al., 2006). However, clearly separating decision 
control from decision manage-ment might pose a serious threat on a board’s ability to perform its 
strategic role (Bezemer et al., 2007). Scholars have highlighted that the maintenance of openness, 
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pro-activeness and a focus on joint value creation are important antecedents of the board’s 
contribution to the strategic decision-making process (Zona and Zattoni, 2007). Moreover, an 
effective contribution of board members to strategy requires both (i) an adequate composition and 
structure, and (ii) well-organized internal processes  (Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009). 
Furthermore, the introduction of governance practices, such as board induction programs and 
annual board reviews, may contribute to an increased awareness of the expected contribution of 
boards to strategy (Huse, 2005). In sum, an increase in the directors’ awareness of their strategic 
function should be associated to a higher consideration from regulators: board composition and 
processes should be designed to allow all members of the board to contribute to strategic 
decision-making (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005).  
Second, practitioners should be aware that most of the contemporary wisdom originates 
from a limited set of empirical contexts. As there may be important differences across contexts in 
terms of role expectations, board structures and actors, practitioners should be careful in applying 
practices in their own national context (Bamberg, 2008; Hambrick et al., 2008). The witnessed 
theoretical and empirical pluralism in the board-strategy literature is supportive in this respect. 
 
Limitations 
Our literature review has several limitations. First, in this review only 81 journals in the 
management domain were included. There could be further research potential in investigating to 
what extent journals in other research fields (e.g. most notably finance, accounting and law) have 
contributed to research on boards and strategy. Second, in this study we solely focused on 
published articles which explicitly mentioned the search terms director or board together with 
strateg* in their title, abstract and/or key words. By choosing this exploratory approach, one risks 
missing important papers that do not claim to be in this domain explicitly and/or refer to strategic 
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content directly. Future studies could examine to what extent our findings hold when a broader 
definition is employed (i.e. governance and strateg*). Third, as a result of the above choices, 
leading books on the topic were not included in our statistical analysis (e.g. Demb and Neubauer, 
1992; Conger et al., 2001; Stiles and Taylor, 2002; Charan, 2005; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; 
Huse, 2007). Future studies could assess how other types of publication (e.g. academic books and 
consultancy reports) have contributed to the development of the board-strategy field. However, 
we believe that also this limitation should not be overemphasized as our analysis includes both 
academic and practitioners journal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our review of the literature on boards and strategy revealed that research on the contribution of 
boards of directors to strategy has rapidly developed and expanded in the last four decades. 
Several changes are observable across different periods in terms of the questions addressed and 
the methods applied. The growing attention witnessed in this review can be ascribed both to new 
challenges companies face in multiple contexts, and to the theoretical advancements in the fields 
of strategic management and corporate governance. Nevertheless, the proliferation of studies and 
the increasing call for more contributions have not provided a clear answer to the question of how 
boards of directors contribute to strategy. Despite all the endeavors undertaken in the past, we 
highlight that the debate on boards and strategy still provides a very promising and challenging 
research agenda. Corporate governance scholars are encouraged to open the black box of board 
research in order to develop a better understanding of the interactions between macro, meso and 
micro dynamics, and how these forces jointly shape the relationship between boards of directors 
and strategy. 
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Figure 1: Historical Development Research on Boards and Strategy 
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Figure 2: Overview of Journals with Included Publications per Time Period 
 
 1972-1989* 1990-2000 2001-2007 overall 
Corporate Governance: An International Review N/A 4 20 24 
Strategic Management Journal 2 7 7 16 
Long Range Planning 8 6 2 16 
Academy of Management Journal 1 8 5 14 
Harvard Business Review 5 6 2 13 
Journal of Management 1 6 4 11 
Administrative Science Quarterly 0 7 3 10 
Journal of Management Studies 0 4 6 10 
California Management Review 6 1 1 8 
Academy of Management Executive 0 2 4 6 
Academy of Management Review 0 3 0 3 
Organizational Dynamics 0 0 3 3 
Organization Studies 0 1 1 2 
Organization Science N/A 2 0 2 
Journal of Small Business Management 0 0 2 2 
British Journal of Management N/A 1 1 2 
International Journal of Technology Management 0 1 1 2 
Management Science 0 0 1 1 
Journal of International Business 1 0 0 1 
Decision Science 0 1 0 1 
Tourism Management 0 0 1 1 
Journal of Organizational Change Management 0 0 1 1 
Service Industries Journal 0 0 1 1 
*N/A: Journal was founded after this particular time period 
 
Page 34 of 37
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 35 
 
Figure 3: Descriptives and Interactions of Topics, Theories, Settings and Data Sources** 
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21 (29%) 
11 (15%) 
14 (19%) 
72 (100%) 
 
0 (0%) 
1 (20%) 
1 (20%) 
3 (60%) 
5 (100%) 
 
8 (22%) 
10 (27%) 
14 (38%) 
5 (14%) 
37 (100%) 
 
34 (30%) 
32 (28%) 
26 (23%) 
22 (19%) 
114 (100%) 
 
2 (6%) 
4 (11%) 
11 (31%) 
19 (53%) 
36 (100%) 
 
36 (24%) 
36 (24%) 
37 (25%) 
41 (27%) 
150 (100%) 
       
Use of Theories*: 
Articles referring to agency theory 
Articles referring to multiple lenses (including agency) 
Articles solely referring to other theories or no theory 
Total  
 
18 (25%) 
20 (28%) 
34 (47%) 
72 (100%) 
 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
5 (100%) 
5 (100%) 
 
3 (8%) 
9 (24%) 
25 (68%) 
37 (100%) 
 
21 (18%) 
29 (25%) 
64 (56%) 
114 (100%) 
 
6 (17%) 
7 (19%) 
23 (64%) 
36 (100%) 
 
27 (18%) 
36 (24%) 
87 (58%) 
150(100%) 
       
Source of Data*: 
Interviews 
Anecdotal Evidence 
Archival Data 
Survey 
Direct Observations 
Multiple Sources 
Total 
 
3 (4%) 
10 (14%) 
39 (54%) 
5 (7%) 
0 (0%) 
15 (21%) 
72 (100%) 
 
2 (40%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
1 (10%) 
0 (0%) 
2 (40%) 
5 (100%) 
 
10 (27%) 
4 (11%) 
6 (16%) 
7 (19%) 
5 (14%) 
5 (14%) 
37 (100%) 
 
15 (13%) 
14 (12%) 
45 (40%) 
13 (11%) 
5 (4%) 
22 (19%) 
114 (100%) 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
15 (13%) 
14 (12%) 
45 (40%) 
13 (11%) 
5 (4%) 
22 (19%) 
114 (100%) 
       
Definition of Board Strategic Involvement*: 
Unspecified 
Boards define strategy at a general level  
Boards are responsible for specific outcomes 
Boards participate to decision-making process 
Total 
 
21 (29%) 
7 (10%) 
37 (51%) 
7 (10%) 
72 (100%) 
 
1(20%) 
3 (60%) 
1 (20%) 
0 (0%) 
5 (100%) 
 
9 (24%) 
10 (27%) 
9 (24%) 
9 (24%) 
37 (100%) 
 
31 (27%) 
20 (18%) 
47 (41%) 
16 (14%) 
114 (100%) 
 
17 (47%) 
8 (22%) 
5 (14%) 
6 (17%) 
36 (100%) 
 
48 (32%) 
28 (19%) 
52 (35%) 
22 (15%) 
150 (100%) 
   
  * Differences between different research settings are statistically significant at the 0.05-level (two-tailed). 
  ** Statistical tests show that the relationships between the main research topic, use of theories, definition of board strategic involvement and research setting  
  are all significant at the 0.05-level (two-tailed) 
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Figure 4: Evolution of the Literature on Boards and Strategy 
 
 1972-1989 1990-2000 2001-2007 overall 
 
Summary: 
Number of articles 
Average number of articles per year 
Average number of articles per journal per year 
 
 
24 
1.33 
0.10 
 
 
59 
5.36 
0.23 
 
 
67 
9.57 
0.42 
 
 
150 
4.16 
0.20 
     
Type of Article†: 
Conceptual 
Empirical 
Total 
 
10 (42%) 
14 (58%) 
24 (100%) 
 
14 (24%) 
45 (76%) 
59 (100%) 
 
12 (18%) 
55 (82%) 
67(100%) 
 
36 (24%) 
114 (76%) 
150 (100%) 
     
Main Research Topic*: 
Determinants of board strategic involvement 
Consequences of board strategic involvement 
Boards’ participation in strategic decision making 
Desirability of strategic involvement (normative) 
Total 
 
3 (13%) 
3 (13%) 
2 (8%) 
16 (67%) 
24 (100%) 
 
16 (27%) 
18 (31%) 
12 (20%) 
13 (22%) 
59 (100%) 
 
17 (25%) 
15 (22%) 
23 (34%) 
12 (18%) 
67 (100%) 
 
36 (24%) 
36 (24%) 
37 (25%) 
41 (27%) 
150 (100%) 
     
Use of Theories*: 
Articles referring to agency theory 
Articles referring to multiple lenses (including agency) 
Articles solely referring to other theories or no theory 
Total  
 
2 (8%) 
1 (4%) 
21 (88%) 
24 (100%) 
 
13 (22%) 
19 (32%) 
27 (46%) 
59 (100%) 
 
12 (18%) 
16 (24%) 
39 (58%) 
67 (100%) 
 
27 (18%) 
36 (24%) 
87 (58%) 
150 (100%) 
     
Research Setting*: 
Articles based on US data only 
Articles based on multiple settings (including the US) 
Articles based on non-US data  
Total 
 
7 (50%) 
4 (29%) 
3 (21%) 
14 (100%) 
 
38 (84%) 
1 (2%) 
6 (13%) 
45 (100%) 
 
27 (49%) 
0 (0%) 
28 (51%) 
55 (100%) 
 
72 (62%) 
5 (4%) 
37 (32%) 
114 (100%) 
     
Source of Data: 
Interviews 
Anecdotal Evidence 
Archival Data 
Survey 
Direct Observations 
Multiple Sources 
Total 
 
1 (7%) 
3 (21%) 
3 (21%) 
2 (14%) 
0 (0%) 
5 (36%) 
14 (100%) 
 
5 (11%) 
4 (9%) 
22 (49%) 
3 (7%) 
2 (4%) 
9 (20%) 
45 (100%) 
 
9 (16%) 
7 (13%) 
20 (36%) 
8 (15%) 
3 (6%) 
8 (15%) 
55 (100%) 
 
15 (13%) 
14 (12%) 
45 (40%) 
13 (11%) 
5 (4%) 
22 (19%) 
114 (100%) 
     
Definition of Board Strategic Involvement*: 
Unspecified 
Boards define strategy at a general level  
Boards are responsible for specific outcomes 
Boards participate to decision-making process 
Total 
 
11 (46%) 
8 (33%) 
3 (13%) 
2 (8%) 
24 (100%) 
 
20 (34%) 
8 (14%) 
26 (44%) 
5 (8%) 
59 (100%) 
 
17 (25%) 
12 (18%) 
23 (34%) 
15 (22%) 
67 (100%) 
 
48 (32%) 
28 (19%) 
52 (35%) 
22 (15%) 
150 (100%) 
   
  * Differences between the three time periods are statistically significant at the 0.05-level (two-tailed). 
  † Differences between the three time periods are statistically significant at the 0.10-level (two-tailed). 
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Figure 5: The Evolution of Research on Board Strategic Involvement* 
 
 Time-Period 1 (1972-1989) Time-Period 2 (1990-2000) Time-Period 3 (2001-2007) 
 
 
Type of Paper 
 
Both conceptual and empirical papers give 
initial input to the field. Early articles are 
published in three practitioner-oriented 
journals (i.e. HBR,LRP,CMR). 
 
Empirical articles gain considerable 
attention in the literature and become by 
far the largest category. 
Empirical articles are still gaining 
importance, while the relative share of 
conceptual papers has halved compared 
to the period 1972-1989. 
 
   
 
Main Research 
Topic 
Researchers endeavor to define to what 
extent boards should (not) be actively 
involved, also in the realm of strategy. 
 
This period is characterized by “input-
output” studies which aimed at exploring 
determinants and consequences of board 
strategic involvement.  
 
The focus of researchers switches to 
boards’ participation to strategic 
decision-making, while “input-output” 
studies remain the largest group. 
    
 
 
Use of Theories 
 
Most studies refer to other theories than 
agency theory (for example: resource 
dependency) or do not use a theory at all 
(as multiple studies are practice driven).   
 
Agency theory becomes the most 
commonly used framework for exploring 
boards’ contribution to strategy.  
This period is characterized by a multi-
theoretical approach to the board-strategy 
debate. Agency theory is still the main 
framework but other theories slowly gain 
importance. 
    
 
Research Setting Empirical articles most often use US 
samples or multi-country samples 
(including the US as research setting) 
US scholars are taking the lead in the field. 
US samples represent almost the totality of 
empirical studies. 
 
European and Asian samples gain 
importance in the debate. They equal the 
number of published articles using US 
samples. 
 
    
 
Sources of Data 
 
Sources of information are quite varied. 
Anecdotes, archival data and mixed 
methods are the most widely used. 
 
This period is mainly characterized by the 
use of archival data and mixed methods.  
Sources of information are quite varied. 
Archival data, surveys and mixed 
methods are the most widely used. 
    
 
Definition of 
Board Strategic 
Involvement 
 
The definition of strategic involvement is 
ill-defined. The expected contributions of 
board members refers to strategy in 
general or remain rather undefined. 
 
Researchers start to specify board strategic 
involvement and mainly focus on specific 
strategic outcomes. 
A growing stream of research relates 
boards to strategic decision making, 
while studies referring to specific 
strategic outcomes remain dominant 
 
 
 * The descriptives in this figure are based upon the presented numbers in figures 2 and 4. 
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